The last working boatyard in Key West.
Put it back to work.

SECTION 01Executive summary

Robbie's Marina is roughly 25 acres of working waterfront on Stock Island — deep water, haul-out yard, seawall, shops, and open ground that does not exist anywhere else in Key West. It has been operated below its potential for years. All Points Boats intends to take over operations under a long-term lease and rebuild it into the only full-service boatyard in the lower Keys.

The thesis in four facts

1. The supply of places to keep and service a boat is structurally short. Industry analysis puts available slips at roughly one for every three to four boats over 30 feet — before counting transients, seasonal traffic, and large yachts.
2. Florida's refit and haul-out capacity is already full. Trade coverage describes an outright capacity crisis in the refit market, with yards expanding hauling capability specifically because demand exceeds it.
3. The biggest capital in the world has confirmed the asset class. Blackstone Infrastructure bought Safe Harbor Marinas — 138 locations, the largest marina operator on earth — from Sun Communities for $5.65 billion, closing April 30, 2025. Safe Harbor has been buying superyacht yards specifically to add service capability. Suntex, backed by Centerbridge with a $1.2 billion acquisition fund, has rolled up 66 properties across 15 states.
4. Key West is the sharpest version of that squeeze in the United States. Fixed land, dense vessel population, near-zero remaining industrial waterfront, and no ability to build more. Stock Island is the last of it.

The arc

Get operational fast on what already exists, then reinvest the cash flow into a facility no one in the Keys can compete with. Revenue starts in week two on the existing lift and yard. From there the property is taken in stages — clear the non-paying inventory and gate the property, repair the seawall and remove the sunken dry dock, build permanent shops, engineer a road and truck-offload facility for vessels arriving in the Keys by trailer, add fuel storage next to an existing island fuel chain, and step up to a heavy lift sized to the fleet that actually exists here — roughly 500 tons, not the biggest machine in the catalogue. Each stage is funded by the one before it, and none of them is required for the yard to be profitable. The full sequence is Section 11.

How we will be different

Geography alone is not a strategy. As institutional capital consolidates the sector, yards are tightening — banning outside contractors, refusing to let owners work on their own boats, and burying fees in the invoice. We intend to run the opposite yard: vetted, not gatekept. Everyone who works here is registered and insured — the same bar any serious yard holds — but qualifying takes minutes through a self-service portal instead of days through a manager. Bring your own contractor. Work on your own vessel. Published rates, no hidden fees, one simple bill. And it runs lean by design: access is a PIN tied to your status and your stay, not a guard on payroll. The consolidators cannot match this, because their economics depend on capturing the service revenue we are choosing to open up — and ours do not. Section 04.1.

Financial figures are planning estimates built from published rates and industry benchmarks — see Sections 07–09 for the build and every assumption behind them.

SECTION 02The property

Stock Island is the working waterfront of Key West — the last industrially zoned marine land before US-1 ends. Everything west of it has been converted to tourism, residential, or resort use over the past three decades. The parcel at 7281 Shrimp Road sits on deep water with direct channel access and is one of the only sites in the lower Keys where a vessel can be hauled, blocked, stored, and worked at scale.

What is on the ground

The honest condition report

The yard is congested with stored vessels — a significant share of which are not paying, or not paying enough to justify the ground they occupy. Several derelict barges and a sunken dry dock sit in the basin. The facility needs cleanup, organization, and process before it needs construction. That is precisely why the opportunity exists. The expensive, irreplaceable components — land, water depth, seawall, industrial zoning, channel access — are already in place and cannot be reproduced in Key West at any price. What is broken is operational, and operations are what a working shop does.

SECTION 03Market research & analysis

3.1 — The structural shortage of places to keep a boat

The marine industry builds roughly 240,000–250,000 boats a year in the United States. Slip inventory has not remotely kept pace: industry analysis puts available slips at approximately one for every three to four boats over 30 feet, and that ratio excludes transient traffic, seasonal migration, and large yachts. Dockage has become materially more expensive and harder to find across Florida, a trend accelerated by institutional buyers acquiring independent marinas and repricing them.

This is the rare supply-demand imbalance that does not self-correct. Building new marine industrial waterfront requires water depth, channel access, industrial zoning, and permits — a combination that regulators in Florida essentially stopped issuing. Existing capacity is converted away from working use, not toward it.

3.2 — Refit and haul-out capacity is already full

The service side is tighter than the storage side. Trade coverage of the superyacht refit market describes a capacity crisis, with Florida and Mediterranean yards operating at or near full capacity handling technical upgrades, compliance work, and interior refits. At least one Florida yard has acquired a neighboring facility purely to expand hauling capacity, taking its lift capability to 485 tons.

The practical result for a Key West boat owner: the yards that can take the work are hours away by water and booked. Every one of those trips is revenue leaving the lower Keys.

3.3 — Institutional capital has validated the asset class

This is the single most important market signal in this document, and it is not our opinion — it is the largest infrastructure transaction in the sector's history.

The read-through is direct. Sophisticated capital is paying record prices for marina platforms and then spending more to add the ability to haul and repair boats. We are proposing to assemble the same combination — working waterfront plus certified service capability — in the one Florida market where no competitor can follow, and to do it under a lease rather than a nine-figure acquisition.

3.4 — Marina economics, benchmarked

Published industry benchmarks give us a defensible frame for what this asset should produce once it is running properly:

3.5 — Key West demand drivers

Resident and transient vessel density. The lower Keys carry a dense population of sportfish, charter, sail, trawler, and commercial vessels, plus year-round transient traffic funneling through Key West. Monroe County's Boating Improvement Fund — generated from recreational vessel registration fees alone — runs roughly $650,000 annually, and the county maintains over 550 aids to navigation across 22 regulatory zones. This is an intensely boated county.

Storm cycles. Every named storm produces a haul-out scramble. Yard space in the Keys sells out within hours of a forecast. A 25-acre yard with a working lift is storm infrastructure: haul-out revenue going in, a repair backlog for months coming out. Insurance carriers increasingly expect a documented haul-out plan — we intend to become that plan for the lower Keys.

Government and commercial fleets. NAS Key West and Coast Guard operations, the Stock Island commercial fishing fleet, ferries, dive operators, and pilot boats all need local service capability that currently does not exist at scale.

The luxury build-out next door. Stock Island's hospitality upgrade is accelerating — Stock Island Marina Village operates 220 slips for vessels to 300 feet, and the former Ocean's Edge reopened as the Hilton Key West Resort & Marina on July 1, 2026 with 175 rooms across 20 acres and 111 wet slips for vessels to 140 feet. These are dockage and hospitality businesses. They generate concentrated service demand within a mile of our gate and have no yard to satisfy it.

SECTION 04Competitive landscape

4.1 — The open yard: our actual competitive strategy

Geography is a moat, but geography can be bought. The durable differentiator is how we choose to operate — and we intend to run the opposite of the model the rest of the industry is converging on.

What the industry is doing

As capital consolidates the sector, yards are closing down. Published boatyard rules routinely state that "all contractors' work is strictly prohibited without prior management's approval," that owners must be pre-approved before touching their own vessel, and that any outside contractor must carry insurance "equal to twice the value of the vessel" plus $1M liability before being allowed near a boat. Industry press states it plainly: "more yards are now saying no to doing it yourself." Owners who still want to work on their own boat are told they may need to make "a few phone calls to find one" that permits it.

Layered on top is the fee structure every boat owner complains about — lay-day minimums, environmental surcharges, disposal fees, power hookups, gate charges, administrative percentages — disclosed at the bottom of an invoice rather than at the top of a conversation.

What we will do instead — vetted, not gatekept

This is not an open gate. Everyone who works on this property is registered, insured, and running through our system — the same standard any serious yard holds. The difference is friction. Other yards use those requirements as a gate to keep outside labor out; we use them as a form to fill in, and then get out of the way.

The operating model that makes it work: lean by design

The open-but-controlled yard is only affordable if the control costs almost nothing to run. That is a deliberate design decision, not a cost cut:

• No gate guard. Access is a PIN tied to your status and your stay — customer, vendor, tenant, or contractor, issued for the duration of the work and expiring with it. The gate becomes a permission system rather than a payroll line, and it produces an access record automatically.
• Self-service compliance. Vendors upload their own insurance certificates to the portal and are notified before expiry. No one on staff chases paperwork; the system refuses to issue a PIN without a current certificate.
• Invoices through the same portal. Vendors submit their billing where they registered. It flows into one customer invoice, which is how "everything runs through us" becomes a convenience rather than a toll booth.
• Headcount added on demand. The yard runs as lean as it can until volume genuinely requires more people — the systems carry the administrative load that other yards solve by hiring.

The strategic point: the portal is not back-office software, it is the competitive advantage. Our position — easier to work at than any yard in Florida, while still fully insured and documented — is only deliverable if the qualifying process is automated. Which makes the vendor portal a day-one build, not a later refinement.

Why this is a strategy and not just goodwill. Three reasons it holds up commercially:

1. The consolidators structurally cannot copy it. Their model is built on capturing service revenue per vessel. Opening the yard to outside labor cuts directly against the economics that justified the acquisition price. We can afford to be open precisely because we are not carrying a nine-figure basis that has to be serviced.
2. It fills the yard, and the yard is what we sell. Every vessel on the property pays haul, lay-days, storage, dockage, and wash regardless of who turns the wrench. Open access maximizes the number of boats on the ground — and ground is the asset. A restrictive policy that turns away a boat costs us the storage revenue to protect service revenue we might not have won anyway.
3. APB does not need protection. A shop with ABS, Lloyd's, and RINA certified procedures does not need a rule preventing customers from hiring someone else. We market the certified structural, fabrication, and refit work that no independent on this island can legally perform, and we let everything else compete honestly.

SECTION 05The operator — All Points Boats

APB has operated a fabrication and refit shop in Fort Lauderdale since 1997. This is not a management company or a broker — it is a working shop with its own welders, fabricators, and project managers, and it is the reason this plan is credible.

• Class-certified welding. ABS, Lloyd's Register, and RINA certified procedures; AWS D1.1 structural steel and D1.2 aluminum. Insurance-grade structural repairs that most yards subcontract, APB self-performs.
• Real fabrication capacity. 5-axis waterjet, CNC, aluminum and stainless fabrication, plus a manufactured product line (fish stations, dock furniture, custom mounts) already selling through the APB store.
• Commercial and cruise track record. Insured contractor work for Carnival, standing agreements in the marine transport and salvage sector, and vendor onboarding with Phoenix International, a deep-ocean recovery contractor to the U.S. Navy.
• Federal-ready. Active SAM.gov registration, CAGE code 6YEM3 — the registration that permits pursuit of Navy, Coast Guard, and FEMA-adjacent work most independent yards cannot touch.
• Existing customer flow. Fort Lauderdale intake can feed Key West: haul the vessel where the space is, work it with the same certified crew.
• Operating systems already built. Berth and reservation planning, facility mapping, project and survey tooling, and financial reporting are constructed and running before day one — not a line item to be purchased later.

SECTION 06Operating structure

The structure under negotiation is a long-term maritime operating lease and facility management agreement — not a real estate purchase. This is the single most capital-efficient feature of the deal.

Why this structure works for every party. The landlord keeps an appreciating asset and gains a professional operator with capital at risk. APB obtains long-term operating control without buying land at Key West prices. Capital partners fund a business whose heavy assets are already built and whose downside is an equipment-and-payroll number rather than a real estate basis. Every party's incentive resolves to the same line: net operating profit.

SECTION 07Revenue model & the 2026 rate card

Two reference points sit behind every figure in this section, and neither is a guess. The first is the yard's own published price list — proof of what this address already collects. The second is a major Fort Lauderdale yard's 2019 sheet, which supplies the pricing structure the current list is missing. Where those two disagree, the reason is given.

The Florida Keys are not Fort Lauderdale, and that cuts both ways. Arguing rates down: a thinner superyacht trade and a smaller average vessel. Arguing them up: every consumable and contractor arrives down US‑1; Monroe County's labour market is severe enough that the county is buying workforce housing at roughly $2,995 a month for a one-bedroom and rationing 657 building permits out to 2036; and Key West has a handful of working yards against Lauderdale's dozens. Scarcity and cost of operation both point upward. The card below holds the yard's proven numbers where they are already strong and adds structure where there is none.

What is structurally wrong with the current list

1 · Haul, block & launch

Held at the yard's published rates. These are current, they are being paid at this address, and the band structure is sound — no case for changing them on day one.

Includes blocking and stands. Beams over 15' add $3/ft. Emergency haul-out from $450 in addition to the regular charge. Half haul (inspection, running gear): $10–30/ft by the same bands, covering the first two hours, $300/hour thereafter. Payable the day of haul.

2 · Dockage — vessels in the water

The one genuinely new structure. The yard's flat $5/ft/day is held as the floor — it is already above the Lauderdale sheet carried forward, which is useful evidence that this market bears more than that one for a berth. Above 80 feet the card escalates, because that is where scarcity is real and where a flat rate leaves the most on the table.

Per foot per day. Multihull and beam-over-15' column is +30%, following the existing wide-beam convention on haul and storage. Dockage is unaffected by the lift limit — a 150-foot vessel can lie alongside without ever being hauled, which is why these bands run higher than the haul bands.

3 · Lay days — vessels on the hard, under work

Banded from zero, which the current list does not do at all below 70 feet. At 51–80 feet the rate lands on $4.00 — the same figure the yard already charges above 70 feet, and the same figure the comparison sheet reaches when carried forward. Two independent references agreeing on a number is the strongest evidence in this section.

Per foot per day, charged from haul to launch. Both the first and last day count, and a vessel not clear of the yard by noon on its departure day is charged the following day — the same hotel clock the billing system runs on. The two largest classes require the Stage 5 lift or a crane operation.

4 · Storage — vessels not under work

A genuine long-term product, deliberately kept cheap and deliberately separated from lay days. It buys ground utilisation in the quiet months without cannibalising the daily rate.

5 · Utilities — one bundled charge, per connection, per day

Florida prohibits marking up resold electricity, so power is not metered and not resold. It is a service charge per connection per day that bundles electricity, water, trash collection, security and wifi — the same structure the comparison yard publishes, which confirms it as standard practice rather than something invented here.

Per connection per day. The no-power tier scales by length (0–50', 51–80', 81'+) and still applies — trash, security and wifi are consumed whether or not a cord is plugged in. Rates carry a premium over the carried-forward comparison because Keys power and haulage costs are higher.

6 · Attached services

7 · Environmental — a department that pays for itself

Waste is documented and charged to the vessel rather than absorbed. This is a compliance requirement before it is a revenue line: the operator is required to control what enters a used-oil container, which is why the cage is locked and monitored and why disposal is a booked transaction rather than a bin in the corner.

Volume control is also a financial control: one contaminated drum can reclassify a month's waste as hazardous and push the yard into a higher generator tier under FAC 62-730.

8 · Priced, but not yet sellable

Two products sit on every comparable sheet and on none of this property's. They are priced here so the capital case in Section 11 has a revenue number attached rather than an aspiration.

Both figures are the comparison yard's 2019 rates carried forward at CPI. They are order-of-magnitude, to be re-quoted against build cost before either is sold.

9 · Stress test — what if the comparison yard raised every year?

The card above carries the 2019 sheet forward at consumer inflation. That is the conservative assumption. A working yard in a constrained coastal market is more likely to have raised its own list annually, so the table below runs the harder case: 10% a year, compounded, for seven years — which nearly doubles the sheet (×1.95) and is roughly two and a half times the rate of inflation over the period.

Running it backwards — what the card actually implies

The more useful test is the inverse. Rather than asking what a 10% escalation would produce, ask what annual rise our own card implies against the 2019 sheet:

Dockage tells the opposite story: the implied rise runs 6–19% a year, steepest at the smallest lengths. That is not an escalation, it is a restructuring. Our small-boat dockage is anchored to this property's own proven $5/ft/day — a Key West number, already being collected at this address — and not to a Fort Lauderdale sheet at all. The comparison yard supplies the shape of the dockage card; the local market supplies the level.

Sourcing, stated plainly. The 2019 sheet is documented. The comparison yard's current published rates are not in hand — the read that our card sits close to them is the direct professional knowledge of the operator who ran that marina — APB South's lead was Marina Manager at the comparison yard and administered the rate card in question. That is primary-source, but it is recollection rather than a document, and it is load-bearing for the lay-day conclusion above. Obtaining that yard's current published card is still the cheapest diligence available on this section — not because the read is doubtful, but because a lender will want the document rather than the recollection. 10%/yr compounded over seven years = ×1.949; CPI over the same period = ×1.306. The operating system carries this test live, so the assumption can be changed rather than argued about.

The six revenue streams, in order of activation

1. Haul-out & launch — day 11 target. The lift is the cash register and the demand generator for everything else.
2. Dry storage & lay-days — same day. Every hauled vessel starts a meter.
3. Wash, bottom & environmental fees — attached automatically to every haul.
4. Dockage — as seawall sections are cleared and returned to service.
5. Service & fabrication labor — APB's core margin; certified work billed at yard rates.
6. Vendor & tenant revenue share — vetted trades operating on campus, billed through the platform.

The streams reinforce each other, which is the point of a full-service yard: a haul-out produces storage days, storage produces service work, service work produces vendor billings, and a clean organized yard produces dockage demand. A dockage-only marina captures one of the six.

Streams added by the build-out (Section 11)

Three further lines are unlocked by capital improvements rather than by cleanup, and they are what turn a good yard into a facility with no regional equivalent:

SECTION 08Financial projections

What follows is a bottom-up build from the published rates above, deliberately underwritten below benchmark occupancy. These are planning estimates, not forecasts, and every driver is stated so it can be challenged line by line.

8.1 — Revenue build

8.2 — Operating expense build

8.3 — Result

A 32% stabilized margin sits within the normal band for a well-run marina and yard operation and is consistent with the ~70% gross margin benchmark on slip revenue once labor-heavy service work is blended in.

8.4 — Why the value creation is asymmetric

At a stabilized EBITDA of roughly $1.65 million and the 2026 market range of 8–14× for marina assets, the operating business supports an enterprise value in the range of $13–23 million, created on an activation budget of under $2 million and no land purchase. Even at the conservative 3–5× multiple some practitioners apply to smaller independents, the range is $5–8 million. The asymmetry comes from a single structural fact: we are buying operations, not waterfront. The waterfront — the part that costs tens of millions and cannot be replicated in Key West — is contributed by the landlord under a 30-year lease.

SECTION 09Capital requirement

This is an equipment, cleanup, and payroll number — not a construction number. Nothing in the activation budget builds permanent infrastructure, which remains the landlord's obligation under the lease.

Capital is staged against milestones rather than drawn at once: mobilization and lift inspection first, equipment on a proven lift second, crew scaling against booked demand third. If the lift inspection returns a materially worse result than expected, the plan pivots to a rental/mobile haul solution while the lift is rebuilt — the revenue sequence slips, the thesis does not break.

SECTION 10The 30 / 60 / 90-day plan

Detailed week-by-week execution lives in the 30-Day Activation Plan. This is the command view across the first quarter.

SECTION 11Years 1–10 — the build-out

The governing principle is sequence: get operational fast on what already exists, then reinvest the cash flow into becoming a facility no one in the Keys can compete with. Nothing in the later stages is required for the yard to make money. Each stage is funded by the one before it.

The build-out at a glance

Stage windows are sequencing targets, not commitments. Each stage is gated on the prior stage's cash flow, on permitting, and on the survey and engineering work specific to it. Capital for Stages 2–5 is expected to come from operations, project financing, and landlord infrastructure obligations under the lease — not from the activation budget in Section 09.

SECTION 12The 50–100 year thesis

Most business plans stop at ten years because most businesses are not built on irreplaceable land. This one is. The half-century case rests on two facts moving in opposite directions — and a third that turns the risk into the opportunity.

12.1 — Working waterfront is a permanently shrinking asset

No new marine industrial waterfront is being created in the Florida Keys. The combination required — water depth, channel access, industrial zoning, upland acreage, and permits — is effectively unobtainable today, and every decade converts more of the remaining stock to residential, resort, and tourism use. The direction of travel over the last thirty years has been one way. Over fifty years, the working waterfront that survives will be a small fraction of what exists now, and whoever holds it will hold something that cannot be competed with, only bought.

12.2 — The water is rising, and the numbers are not ambiguous

Any honest hundred-year plan for the Florida Keys has to start here. Projections from the Southeast Florida Regional Climate Change Compact indicate roughly 12 inches of sea level rise by 2030 and more than 30 inches by 2060. Monroe County's own vulnerability work is starker still:

Under high-end 2100 scenarios, 2.7 feet of rise affects roughly 55% of the population and 5.4 feet affects roughly 83%. The preliminary estimate to elevate roads in just two pilot communities is $1.8 billion. We are not going to pretend this is someone else's problem. It is the defining physical fact of the next century in Monroe County.

12.3 — Why a boatyard is the right thing to own into that century

Here is the asymmetry, and it is the heart of the long thesis. Sea level rise is catastrophic for housing, roads, and land-dependent commerce. For marine infrastructure it is something closer to the opposite:

• A boatyard's core function appreciates as the water rises. More water, more storms, more flood exposure, and more insurance pressure all drive the same behaviors: haul the boat, store it on high ground, repair it after the event. Our demand curve moves with the risk curve.
• Hardstand is the cheapest thing on earth to elevate. Raising a road or a neighborhood costs billions. Raising, filling, and re-grading yard acreage is ordinary civil work performed incrementally over decades out of operating cash flow. A yard can adapt at a fraction of the cost per acre that residential infrastructure requires.
• As land access degrades, water access appreciates. If 81% of Monroe County roadways face impact by 2100, the Keys shift back toward the water-dependent logistics posture they held before the Overseas Highway. Deep-water access with upland staging at the end of the island chain stops being a marine business and starts being strategic infrastructure — for supply, for emergency response, for the movement of everything the road can no longer carry reliably.
• Storm response becomes a permanent business line. Twenty-five cleared acres with deep water, staging capability, and federal registration is the natural forward operating base for state, federal, and utility response in the lower Keys. That is not a hypothetical revenue line over a century — it is a recurring one.
• The build-out is the century strategy in miniature. The three capital stages in Section 11 are not just revenue lines — each one is an adaptation asset. Fuel storage is energy security on an island chain at the end of a single vulnerable highway. The truck offload facility is the interface between road logistics and water logistics, which is precisely the transfer point that gains value as the road becomes less reliable. Heavy haul-out is the ability to lift large vessels out of the water in a place where the water is rising. Built for commercial reasons in this decade, all three read as strategic infrastructure in the next century.

12.4 — What the fifty-to-hundred-year plan actually commits to

SECTION 13Risk register

SECTION 14The ask

Three things stand between this plan and a working yard.

1. Execute the operating agreement. Drafted and in counsel review. It needs legal time and signatures, not more meetings.
2. Commit activation capital of $1.5–2.0 million, staged against milestones. This is equipment, cleanup, insurance, crew, and working capital — not construction, and not land.
3. Execute the August 10 survey. Full vessel census, lift inspection, seawall and utility condition. This converts every estimate in this document into a measured, committed number.

Every claim in this document is checkable. The claims that are not yet verified say so on their face, and one claim from an earlier draft has been corrected against research rather than defended. That is how we intend to run the yard, and how we intend to report on it.

SECTION 15Sources & references

Market data in Section 03, financial benchmarks in Section 08, and climate projections in Section 12 are drawn from the following. Rate-card figures are the operating yard's own published pricing; Key West dockage comps are market observations as of July 2026.

1. Blackstone Infrastructure / Safe Harbor Marinas $5.65B acquisition — Boating Industry; Marina World, "Why are marinas attracting institutional investors?"
2. Suntex / Centerbridge $1.2B JV, Windward merger — Suntex Marinas; Marina Deal Flow, Top Acquirers 2025–2026
3. Slip supply ratio, dockage cost pressure, consolidation effects — Seaport RE, "What Makes a Marina a Strong Commercial Investment in 2026?"
4. Superyacht refit capacity crisis; yard expansion to 485-ton haul capability — International Boat Industry; Marina World, "Navigating investments in boatyard and repair facilities"
5. Marina financial benchmarks — revenue/slip, $/ft/yr, occupancy, margins, cap rates, EBITDA multiples — Marina Deal Flow FAQ; DealStream, Marina Rules of Thumb; CT Acquisitions, marina valuation guide
6. Stock Island Marina Village — 220 slips, vessels to 300' — Weiler Engineering project record
7. Hilton Key West Resort & Marina, opened July 1 2026 — 175 rooms, 20 acres, 111 slips to 140' — Marina World
8. Monroe County marine resources, Boating Improvement Fund (~$650K/yr), navigation infrastructure — Monroe County Marine Resources
9. Sea level rise projections and roadway/housing vulnerability — Monroe County GreenKeys Sustainability Action Plan; The Nature Conservancy, "Can the Florida Keys Adapt to Sea-Level Rise?"; WSP, Florida Keys Resilient Infrastructure Pilot
10. Boatyard contractor restrictions, DIY prohibitions, and insurance thresholds (basis for the Section 04.1 open-yard position) — Power & Motoryacht, "The Impact of Environmental Laws on DIY Boat Owners"; Seminole Marine yard rules; Berkeley Marine Center DIY policies; Gig Harbor Marina & Boatyard policies
11. Robbie's Marina of Key West — complete published price list, services, about, thrift store, guides, and haul request form, captured July 30 2026 — robbieskw.com (full capture retained in the admin Robbie's Baseline)
12. Foreign-Trade Zone structure and Florida zone list (basis for the Section 11 correction) — U.S. Foreign-Trade Zones Board; FTZ 281, Miami-Dade County